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Abstract 
 
The deregulation process in the EU electricity sector triggered strategic decisions that 
led to industry restructuring. This paper presents preliminary evidence of the impact of 
this process on investors, using event studies and estimation techniques such as least 
squares and GARCH. Our findings suggest three stylized facts: 1) regulatory reform in 
Europe was certainly accompanied by a takeover wave, as predicted by Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996); 2) mergers and acquisitions had a positive impact on the stock price of 
target firms, and a much lower and sometimes even a negative impact for the bidding 
firms; 3) the effect of takeover announcements on the returns of competitors of the 
merging firms depends on the degree of market power. In countries with high market 
power (like Spain) competitors significantly increase share returns upon takeover 
announcements, whereas in countries with lower market power (like England and 
Wales) returns do not change significantly. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the impact of regulatory 
reform in the European energy markets on the market for corporate control. Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996) and Jensen (1993) found that factors such as changes in regulatory 
governmental policies had an important effect on the takeover wave in the financial, 
transport, and energy sectors of the USA in the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, as we 
document below, energy firms undertook actions in the market for corporate control to 
adapt to the regulatory changes (liberalization, deregulation, regulatory reform, 
privatization) that took place in Europe starting in the last decades of the twentieth 
century. More specifically, these changes have triggered an unprecedented wave of 
mergers and acquisitions, many of them through takeovers (see Green, 2006; Trillas, 
2006; and Codognet et al., 2002). However, there is very little work on the relationship 
between regulatory changes and corporate control activity. In particular, an exercise that 
has become standard for other industries (to compute through event studies the impact 
of corporate changes on shareholder value and extract economic implications from it) 
has not been extensively applied to European energy firms (see Trillas, 2001, for a very 
limited exception). This paper is a first attempt to fill this gap. 
 We provide information on the coincidence in time of regulatory reform and 
very significant changes in corporate ownership, and we quantify the impact of some 
corporate control events on transacting companies’ stock returns through a range of 
estimation techniques, such as least squares, GARCH and SURE. We obtain three 
important results: 1) The European energy sectors have experienced a wave of mergers 
and acquisitions, which has been contemporaneous to the regulatory reform process. 2) 
There are statistically significant positive abnormal returns for target firms and weakly 
significant negative returns for the bidding firms; and 3) Takeovers have a positive 
effect on the value of competitors in a market characterized by high market power 
(Spain), and non-significantly different from zero effect on the value of competitors in a 
market characterized by low market power (England and Wales).   
Significant changes in public policies or technology, supply and demand shocks, 
trigger changes in industry structure (see Weston et al., 1990; and Ravenscraft, 1987). 
European energy firms are a case in point; they do not stay as spectators of regulatory 
reform, but try to position themselves to face the new challenges. These actions take 
place in many instances through the market for corporate control. Event studies quantify 
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the impact of hese actions on shareholder value, and this may provide a test for a variety 
of economic hypotheses. The methodology is based on measuring the reaction of 
shareholders’ expectations in front of new information and, therefore, the expected 
effect on the firm’s discounted value (see Fama et al., 1969; Binder, 1998; Campbell et 
al., 1997; and Khotari and Warner, 2006). A merger for example may create value for 
shareholders, through efficiencies caused by scale or scope economies, vertical 
integration, or through increased market power (see Cox and Portes, 1998; Bradley et 
al., 1988; and Eckbo, 1983). This paper uses OLS and GARCH estimation techniques to 
analize the impact of changes in the corporate control of the main European energy 
firms on their value, as measured through stock prices. Especifically, we first analyze 
target behavior through the impact of takeovers launched on Endesa, Hidrocantábrico, 
and Scottish Power. Next we look at the effect of takeovers on the returns of competing 
firms.
4
 And finally, we quantify the impact of mergers and acquisitions for eleven of the 
most important energy firms in Europe: E.ON, RWE, Endesa, Gas Natural, Iberdrola, 
Unión Fenosa, ENEL, ENI, Energías de Portugal, Suez and Vattenfall.  
The Electricity and Gas Directives in the European Union, aiming at the creation 
of an Internal Market in energy, thus triggered a mergers and acquisitions wave. 
National and European authorities have taken a not always coherent stance vis-à-vis 
such processes, sometimes promoting the transactions and in other occasions opposing 
them. We review some takeover attempts that took place in the recent past, and report 
evidence on the winners and losers of this process, through stock market (event study) 
and other data.  
National governments have not passively contemplated this takeover wave. For 
example, The Economist (September 1
st
, 2006) reported that in preparation for the full 
liberalisation of Europe's energy markets, the Spanish government thought that it 
needed a national energy champion that could rival the gigawatts of Electricité de 
France and Germany's RWE. So it was backing Gas Natural, a Spanish gas company 
based in Barcelona, the Catalan capital, which launched a hostile bid for Endesa in 
September 2005, initially opposing a competing bid from E.On. At the same time, the 
French government was promoting the merger between Suez and Gaz de France to 
avoid a hostile approachment by Enel in the French energy markets. Other national 
governments, notably the British, were less eager to defend national champions.  
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 For example, for the three takeovers that had Endesa as target, we analyze their effect on the returns of 
Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa, which are Endesa’s competitors in the Spanish electricity market. 
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Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Jensen (1993) and Weston et al. (1990), argue 
that firms in industries such as airlines, banking and natural gas, underwent a mergers 
and acquisitions wave as a result of federal deregulation at the end of the 1970s and 
early 1980s in the USA. Deregulation increases the importance of managerial role, 
thereby increasing the marginal benefits for shareholders of managerial monitoring, 
requiring more concentrated shareholding structures (Trillas, 2000). This can be useful 
to put in context the events that have taken place in European energy markets in the last 
ten years. Deregulation increases the costs of monitoring managers’ behavior and injects 
uncertainty and instability in the business environment. In the midst of such instability, 
investors must determine which part of success or failure is owed to managers and 
which part is owed to factors beyond their control. Increased instability increases the 
costs of observing the managers’ conduct, which also favors more concentrated 
structures.  
With liberalization processes the frontiers of firms cease to be frozen. The 
expansion of regulated firms
5
 seeks to take advantage of new growth opportunities 
derived from the possibility of entering to compete with incumbent firms in other 
segments or geographical areas (in new markets, mergers and acquisitions attract less 
the attention of anti-trust authorities than in traditional markets). Being the incumbent 
firm in another jurisdiction makes a firm a more credible rival, and this intensifies 
competition. Nevertheless, the optimal size of the firm from the managers’ point of 
view is usually higher than the optimal size for shareholders and for society at large 
(remember that some of the greatest corporate control scandals in the world have been 
related to the uncontrolled expansion of firms that were born in regulated sectors, such 
as Enron or Vivendi). Acquiring firms have the opportunity to diversify their revenue 
sources, and seek synergies with their traditional businesses, exploiting potential scale 
and scope economies. The countries that are recipient of investments, usually but not 
always developing countries, wish to import technology and capital. Some acquirers, 
not necessarily the most efficient, can benefit from predatory capital subsidies from the 
country of origin owing to generous regulation, or their managers can benefit from 
relaxed forms of control from their shareholders. 
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 In the U.S., one of the issues which was historically regulated was the possibility of expansion by 
electricity firms. The repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act in 2005 removed this constraint.  
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Network industries subject to regulation, such as the electricity industry, are 
characterized by large sunk and long lived investments. To the extent that there are 
natural monopoly segments (distribution, transmission and system operation; in the 
past, generation and retail were deemed also part of a vertically integrated natural 
monopoly) price regulation of these parts of the industry becomes necessary, which 
results into the well-known time inconsistency problem of regulation: the regulator 
receives strong pressures not to remunerate sufficiently the investments, once these have 
occurred, so that investors lack the incentives to fund the investments in the first place.   
The different mechanisms that societies have historically developed to alleviate this 
problem have crucially affected the different forms of ownership of electricity firms that 
have existed. Public sector ownership of firms was during many decades the preferred 
form of alleviating the problem, because the firm used to internalize in its objective 
function the interests of consumers and investors. The presence of ownership 
mechanisms different from private ownership in the energy sectors of many countries 
must be seen in this context: state-owned firms, municipal firms, firms owned by 
regional or provincial governments, cooperatives, firms owned by non-profit saving 
banks. Popular capitalism (selling shares of previously state-owned firms to the 
dispersed public to spread stock ownership amongst the population, as promoted by the 
Thatcher governments in Britain in the eighties and early nineties) was also thought to 
internalize the problem, since voters/consumers became also investors.
6
 In countries 
such as Spain, where state-owned firms co-existed in the electricity sector with privately 
owned firms, collusion between policy makers and firms, and the presence of financial 
institutions among the stock owners, were also in practice a way to alleviate the time 
inconsistency problem in regulation, at the cost of other inefficiencies and of a serious 
legitimacy and transparency problem.  
The presence of private investors in large electricity firms gives rise to agency 
problems, which must be compounded to regulatory risk problems. It is well-known that 
there are a variety of mechanisms, all of them costly and imperfect, to prevent managers 
from behaving in a non profit-maximizing way: a direct monitoring role by owners or 
boards of directors, monetary incentives, product market competition, managers’ labor 
market competition, and takeovers.  
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 Rate of return regulation used to guarantee the value of investments and the supervising role of 
regulatory agencies was a subsidy to the monitoring task of shareholders. Incentive regulation ceased to 
guarantee a profit level, so that management decisions got their central role re-established, but again 
tension showed up in the form of a credibility problem to keep a fixed price. 
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Takeovers in regulated sectors can in theory be a mechanism to control 
managers, although academic research (summarized by Trillas, 2000) reveals that 
takeovers have a lower success ratio, last longer until they are completed if they are 
completed at all, and are costlier in regulated sectors than in other sectors. Stakeholders 
use the regulatory game to mobilize themselves. Takeovers attract light to regulated 
sectors, which usually is detrimental to bidding firms, because consumer activism 
increases and this reduces the discounted value of future profits. The newly acquired 
saliency of regulatory issues makes consumers aware of their interest to exploit the sunk 
cost nature of regulated assets on the one hand, and gives them an incentive to incur the 
costs of making their voice heard because this time the media and the politicians are 
paying attention. The activism of other stakeholders, such as workers and local 
communities, is similarly affected.
7
 Takeovers take place with the theoretical objective 
of replacing inefficient managers with others that can obtain more value from the firm’s 
assets. However, takeovers may destroy value if the managers of bidding firms over-
estimate their abilities, or if they wish to expand beyond what is optimal for their 
shareholders. Although one would expect that bad bidders become good targets, in 
practice public ownership, golden shares, and instruments of a similar nature make this 
very difficult in some countries.
8
  
 The fact that privatizations often coincide with deregulation processes makes it 
difficult to untangle the effects on productive efficiency of deregulation and the effects 
of privatization. Moreover, it is debatable whether in some countries as in Spain,
9
 the 
governance of privatized firms as a result of the new ownership structure are those that 
benefit more firms and industries that are in the midst of a deregulation process.  
However, it can certainly be that some privatizations manage to improve productive 
efficiency, being in any case an empirical matter.  
After this introduction, the paper describes the regulatory changes that have 
taken place in Europe and their effects on firms’ decisions. Next, we present some 
hypotheses and explain the methodology and data that will be used to test them. Finally, 
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 See Trillas (2001). 
8
 The so-called golden shares were introduced in the United Kingdom in the eighties, and give the 
government veto power in strategic transactions such as ownership changes that alter the control structure 
of firms. 
9
 Some of the outstanding patterns in the last ten years are the emergence in the Spanish electricity market 
of foreign firms still dominated by the public sector (ENEL in Viesgo, and Electricidade de Portugal in 
Hidrocantábrico), and the increasing influence of agents that have been successful in other industries in 
the Spanish economy in the recent past, such as saving banks and construction firms. 
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we show the quantitative results in terms of the impact of corporate changes on the 
value of firms, and finally we conclude.  
 
2. Regulatory changes and implications for firms’ behavior  
2.1. Regulatory Changes in Europe 
After the pioneering experiences of the United Kingdom and Norway during the 
1980s, the European Union started a gradual effort to liberalize the energy sectors. The 
starting point was the December 1996 96/92/CE electricity Directive, and the July 1998 
98/30/C Gas Directive. These first directives established a compromise between the 
countries that had already started the liberalization and those that saw it as a very 
remote prospect. Member states had at that stage very different market structures, some 
with vertically integrated state owned national incumbents, and others with publicly or 
privately owned regional or local firms. The compromise had three main objectives : 1) 
Accounting separation between potentially competitive and monopolistic segments. 2) 
Freedom of choice for large consumers and 3) Increasing autonomy for transmission 
networks.
10
   
The implementation of these steps was slow and problematic. In some countries, 
such as France and Germany, those in charge of making decisions took from the outset 
a very hostile approach towards the process, setting very tough conditions to open their 
energy market. In 2003, a second package of directives established the full liberalization 
of supply for business and industrial customers by July 2004, and for all users including 
residential ones by July 2007. It also introduced the requirement that member states 
should create independent national regulatory agencies.  
Again countries differed in the implementation of the second package (Green, 
2006, Glachant and Finon, 2003). By 2005, in one extreme a small number of countries 
had completely liberalized their gas and electricity markets. In the other extreme France, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece fulfilled the minimum requirements of the first directives, but 
had only opened a small part of their energy industries to competition.   
Cross-border electricity exchanges were quite scarce in that period. For example, 
according to EC (2007), in 2005, cross-border flows of consumed electricity in EU 
member-states plus Norway and Switzerland, only represented on average close to 11% 
of total consumption, which amounts to a pretty modest increase, given that in years 
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1998 and 2000 they were 7.5% and 8.9%, respectively. In spite of increasing efforts to 
interconnect Europe, the integration process had resulted in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century into a number of fragmented markets (six in total, according to 
Haas et al. 2006).  
In 2007 the Commission published the results of an investigation which 
criticized the state of competition in the electricity sector.
11
 Specifically, the 
Commission focused on three interrelated problems: 1) Excessive horizontal 
concentration in generation. 2) Excessive vertical integration between generation and 
transmission and, 3) scarce interconnection between national grids. As a result of this 
investigation, a third package of regulations was set in motion, through which the 
Commission had as objectives vertical separation and the interconnection of segmented 
markets. The package included the obligatory creation of independent system operators. 
The total separation between system operation and transmission ownership was initially 
considered as an option. This was not accepted by countries with vertically integrated 
incumbents (especially France and Germany). Additionally, the directives consolidated 
the authority of national independent regulators and created an EU-wide regulatory 
agency, based on the cooperation of national regulators (see Trillas, 2009).  
Liberalization has not achieved the objective of effective competition in most 
energy markets, as shown by Green (2006) and Glachant and Lévêque, eds. (2009). But 
it has triggered a process of industry restructuring, as a result of which ownership 
concentration has increased (Green, 2006, and Trillas, 2006).  
 
2.2. Expansion and multimarket contact by European energy firms  
Several European firms in the energy sectors have enormously expanded during 
the recent years, as shown in García-Rendón (2010). It shows the volume of sales in a 
number of regions in 2006. The case of the two largest German firms, RWE and E.ON, 
is remarkable. The former made 60% of its sales in its country of origin, and the 
remaining 40% is shared between the United Kongdom (20.25%), other EU countries 
(13.5%) and 4% in American markets. The latter made only 56% of its sales in 
Germany. The Swedish Vattenfall made 40% of its sales in Sweden, 48% in other 
Scandinavian countries, 33% in Germany and 6% in Poland. Spanish firms (with a high 
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focus on Latin America), Italian ENI and British Centrica also show high levels of 
foreign activity.  
Multi-market contact is one of the features that facilitates collusion. Firms that 
are asymmetric in a national market may see symmetry restored once market shares and 
efficiencies are compared at an international level. Relatedly, firms that may be under 
close scrutiny by national anti-trust authorities, may have more room of manœuvre in 
international markets, where market shares will be smaller. Collusion is easier to sustain 
when firms compete in more than one market. Of course, as many other features that 
facilitates collusion, this does not prove the existence of collusion, which is merely one 
of many possible equilibria of a repeated game.  
Table 1 shows how this multi-market contact takes place for European gas and 
electictricity markets. Incumbent firms in one country are significant entrants in other 
countries. The table underestimates the scope of multi-market contact, to the extent that 
it does not show contacts in non-European countries and contacts in non-energy 
markets, such as telecommunications. Section 4 and García-Rendón (2010) give further 
details of the transformation that has been taking place in terms of industry structure. 
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Table 1. Presence of the main energy firms in EU countries in 2004 
 
 Electricity Gas 
Country Largest Other significant Largest Other significant 
Austria VERBUND RWE, E.ON, EDF OMV GDF, RWE 
Belgium E-BEL EDF, ESSENT, 
NOUN, CENTRICA 
DISTRIGAS ESSENT, NUON, 
CENTRICA 
Denmark ELSAM E2, VATTENFALL, 
E.ON 
DONG  
Finland FORTUM VATTENFALL, 
E.ON 
GASUM  
France EDF E-BEL, ENDESA GDF TOTAL 
Germany RWE E.ON, 
VATTENFALL, EDF 
E.ON  WINNGAS, RWE, 
EXXON, SHELL 
Greece PPC  DEPA  
Ireland ESB NIE BGE RWE  
Italy ENEL   E-BEL, ENDESA, 
EDISON, VERBUND 
ENI   EDISON 
Netherlands E-BEL ESSENT, NOUN, 
E.ON 
SHELL EXXON 
Portugal EDP   ENDESA   GDP  
Spain ENDESA    IBERDROLA, EDP, 
ENEL, UNION 
FENOSA 
GAS 
NATURAL   
BP, IBERDROLA, 
CEPSA 
Sweden VATTENFAL
L 
E.ON, FORTUM E.ON   DONG 
United 
Kingdom 
 EDF, E.ON, RWE, 
CENTRICA 
CENTRICA SHELL, EXXON, BP, 
E.ON, EDF, RWE 
Poland BOT PKE, PAK, E-BEL, 
EDF 
PGNIG  
Check 
Republic 
CEZ RWE, E.ON RWE  E.ON   
Slovakia ENEL TEKO, RWE, EDF, 
E.ON 
SPP(GDF, 
E.ON) 
 
Hungary MVM EDP, E.ON, RWE MOL GDF, RWE, E.ON, ENI 
Slovenia HSE  GEOPLIN  
Source: Commission’s Report on the implementation of the internal gas and electricity market (2005). 
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3. Hypotheses, methodology and data 
3.1. Hypotheses 
Any expansion of firms raises questions about its impact on shareholder wealth. 
Event studies provide evidence of such impact, by measuring the abnormal returns 
associated to unanticipated events. To the extent that financial markets are efficient, 
event studies provide evidence on the impact of the announcements on the firm’s stream 
of profits and, therefore, its discounted value. A merger can create value for 
shareholders if there are efficiency synergies (scope or scale economies, vertical 
integration) or if the merger increases market power.
12
 This usually translates into 
positive abnormal returns for target firms’ shareholders, while stock prices of bidding 
firms may not significantly change (see Campa and Hernando, 2004, and Bradley et al., 
1988). The literature explains this as a free-rider problem: shareholders only sell their 
shares if the bidding price equals the expected price of the shares after the takeover. 
Then any improvement in the value of the firm triggered by the change in management 
is captured by the shareholders of the target firm. It could also happen that value is 
destroyed as a result of the merger, if the bidding firm overpays for the target. This may 
be a signal that mergers are carried out for reasons that are unrelated to shareholder 
wealth. For example, the optimal size of the firm for managers may be larger than the 
optimal size from the point of view of the value of the firm (empire building).  
We are interested in looking at empirical evidence through the lens of two hypotheses :  
 
Hypothesis 1:  
The value of target firms in the energy sector increases when a takeover is announced. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
The effect of the announcement of a takeover on the value of competitiors depends on 
the existence of market power. If market power is high, competing firms experience 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns.  
 
According to Bradley et al. (1988) a merger becomes an opportunity for the 
buying firm given the possibility of value creation, despite the costs of the transaction. 
Value creation may result from exogenous changes in supply or demand that increase 
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 Cox and Portes (1998). 
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the profit maximizing firm size. Synergies may include more efficient management, or a 
better matching between management and physical assets. They may also include 
vertical efficiencies (through the elimination of double marginalization, through the 
internalization of externalities or through better incentives for sunk investments), or the 
combination of complementary resources. Finally, a higher value of the firm may be 
due to increased unilateral or multilateral market power that derives from a lower 
number of firms (Eckbo, 1983).  
In most empirical studies, shareholders of acquired firms are the main winners of 
corporate transactions. Andrade et al. (2001) for example find that target shareholders in 
US takeovers between 1973 and 1998 make a positive return of 16% on average upon 
announcement of a takeover, whereas bidding shareholders lose on average 0.7%, but 
the statistical significance is very low.  
Campa and Hernando (2004) find that the value generated for investors of target 
firms of mergers and acquisitions in the EU, receive, on average, statistically significant 
9% cumulative abnormal returns, and that cumulative returns for bidding firms are zero. 
They also find that previously regulated firms experience comparatively lower abnormal 
returns.  
It could be that improvements in social efficiency derived from a merger can be 
sufficiently high to compensate for the loss of welfare from collusion, if this exists. But 
if a merger increases the chances of collusion, it should be welcomed by shareholders of 
competing firms. The effect of a takeover or a merger announcement on non-merging 
competitors, however, is a topic that has been less explored from an empirical point of 
view. Eckbo (1983) argues that the sign of the expected effect on rivals is unclear. 
Abnormal returns could be positive, because the number of firms in the industry 
diminishes, and this increases unilateral (for example, in a Cournot model) and 
multilateral market power (in more general repeated oligopoly models), which also 
benefits the rivals of merging firms. But abnormal returns for rivals could also be 
negative, if they anticipate that the merging firms will be more efficient and therefore 
more competitive, hindering the profitability of their rivals. Consistent with the first 
possibility, Duso et al. (2006) find, for a sample of mergers and acquisitions that were 
analyzed by the European Commission, statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns for the competitors of the merging firms.   
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3.2. Methodology 
Event study techniques have been used to evaluate corporate events and the 
effect of regulatory changes in different industries. Hypotheses that make some 
prediction for firms’ profits can be tested with these widely and increasingly used 
techniques. The theoretical foundations and the basic empirical techniques are discussed 
for example in Lamdin (2001),
13
 Roberts (1967), Cox and Portes (1998) and Markiel 
(2003). A crucial assumption of event studies is that all publicly available information is 
incorporated in stock prices, that is, the semi-strong version of the efficient market 
hypothesis holds. This is not the place to discuss this hypothesis, but it is a salutary 
caveat to remark that many of the economic implications of event studies hold to the 
extent that this hypothesis is valid. 
The most widespread model used to predict normal returns of firm j in period t is 
the market model. Then real returns are compared to these normal returns to obtain a 
measure of abnormal returns (Campbell et al., 1997, and Fama et al., 1969). 
 
tjtmjjtj RR ,,,          (1) 
 with 0)( , tjE   and  jtjVar 
2
, )(   
 
where jtR  are the returns of firm j  in period t , mtR  are the returns of a portfolio of 
firms representing the stock market (we use Eurofirst 300), j and j  are parameters 
and  jt  is an error term. To this model, one can add a dummy variable: 
 
tjtjjtmjjtj DRR ,,,,         (2) 
 
Where j  captures the abnormal return of action j in the date of event t, directly 
estimated in the regression. One can group sets of actions to compute average abnormal 
returns, for examples for takeover events of a same firm or group of firms. With several 
firms, it iwould be possible to obtain extra information by using a system of equations 
(Binder, 1985):  
1,11
1
,11,1   

ta
A
a
tmt FRR  
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,,,  
 
where n ...1 are the error terms for the n firms. These terms can be heteroskedastic 
across firms, but not correlated over time. It is also possible to introduce restrictions 
over coefficients, such as equality of betas, which can be tested through maximum 
likelihood or Wald tests.  
 
As argued by Savickas (2003), an appropriate approach used to estimate the volatility of 
the conditional process of the variance, can be represented as follows: 
 
tjtjjtmjjtj DRR ,,,,         (4) 
),0( ,, tjtj hN  
tjjtjjtjjjtj Ddchbah ,1,
2
1,,      
 
where tjh , is the conditional variance of the time variation and jjjj dcba ,,,  are the 
coefficients of the GARCH (1,1) specification; tjD ,  dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
date of the event for firm j and 0 otherwise. j  captures the coefficient of the abnormal 
returns on the date of the announcement. The conditional variance tjh ,  provides a 
natural estimator of the variance of the abnormal returns. 
 
The GARCH approach explicitly models the volatility of the returns and the possible 
increase of the variance that takes place when there are unforeseen events. In the 
estimation through a traditional approach such as OLS, there is a higher probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis when this is not false (Savickas, 2003). 
 
3.3. Data 
The events concerning takeovers, mergers and acquisitions for each of the firms 
were selected from the data bases LEXIS-NEXIS and OSIRIS. The criterion that was 
15 
 
used for their selection was that they had the characteristic of a ―surprise‖ event, that is, 
not anticipated by the market.   
The historical series of daily stocks and indices was obtained from Yahoo 
Finance
14
 and in some cases directly through the firms (as in the case of the historical 
series of Hidrocantábrico stock prices; Hidrocantábrico ceased to be traded as an 
independent stock when it was acquired by Electricidade de Portugal). The European 
indices used in the estimations is Eurofirst 300.  
 
4. Impact of corporate change on the value of the main European 
energy firms   
4.1. The Market for Corporate Control in the Energy Sector
15
  
Europe has seen an unprecedented crossborder mergers and acquisitions wave in 
the energy sectors at the beginning of the XXI century. This seems to have been in 
preparation or as a reaction to regulatory reform in the industry. If companies cannot 
influence market rules, they may try to influence industry structure. We present in this 
subsection some case studies that show how takeovers in energy sectors are protracted 
and how the setting is such that the shareholders of the target firms stand to gain much 
more than the shareholders of bidding firms. 
 
The Endesa Takeover Battle 
In September 2005 the Spanish firm Gas Natural made an offer for Endesa that 
triggered a bitter economic and political debate, because a company based in Barcelona 
(the second largest city in the country) was trying to take over a company based in the 
capital Madrid. The management team of Endesa defended its position using political 
and economic strategies. In 2006, an offer by E.On improved upon the one by Gas 
Natural, although it was also initially rejected by the management team, and triggered a 
reaction by the Spanish government trying to stop a surprise acquisition of control by 
foreign interests. This reaction included a discretional change in the rules of the 
elecricity regulatory agency that allowed this agency to stop a merger appealing to 
reasons of security of supply or national interest. In 2007, the battle finished with an 
Italian company, ENEL, which had the Italian state as the main shareholder, gaining 
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 The full list of individual events on which this subsection is based can be found in García-Rendón 
(2010) and is available upon request. 
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control of the company in partnership with a Spanish construction firm, apparently with 
the agreement of the Spanish government. 
Spanish electricity firms (and especially Endesa) had been among the 
protagonists of a remarkable expansion process characterized by investments in Latin 
America. The global result of the expansion in Latin America was neutral for Endesa’s 
shareholders, according to the event study technique, although the impact of the largest 
acquisition, the takeover of Chilean firm Enersis, was negative according to two studies 
mentioned below. Endesa also expanded in telecommunications (Retevisión, Amena, 
Menta, later integrated under the company name Auna), although it has recently 
abandoned this industry after the sale of Auna to Ono and France Telecom.
16
 Both in 
Telefónica and in Endesa there are reasons to believe that the main corporate control 
mechanisms did not work appropriately. There were no shareholders with a controlling 
stake, there was no credible takeover threat at the time (either because of public 
ownership at the early stages of the expansions, or because of the government’s threat to 
use the golden share), and product market and managerial labor market competition 
were scarce.  The takeover of Enersis, the largest privatized electricity firm in Chile, in 
the late 1990s, took longer and was more costly than expected, and with a negative 
effect on (both bidder and target) shareholder wealth. It is not clear either that Chilean 
consumers were better off with the takeover. On the one hand, the takeover put pressure 
on the Chilean regulator to improve competition conditions in electricity, by triggering a 
debate on vertical integration. But Endesa won the takeover battle by defeating an offer 
by the American firm Duke Energy, which was less willing to pay the high cost of a 
protracted and politicized battle, but it may well have had a better business plan for 
consumers.  
Precise quantitative evidence on the effects of Spanish firms’ expansion comes 
from event studies, which provide a measurement of the impact of particular events on 
shareholders’ expectations (and, therefore, to the extent that financial markets are 
efficient, a quantification of the expected effect on the firm’s discounted value). López 
Duarte and García Canal (2005) report a positive and significant effect of foreign 
investments of all Spanish firms (not only in the electricity sector) on shareholder value, 
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 Unión Fenosa is also a Spanish electricity firm with significant investments outside the energy sectors, 
for example in the Airports sector in Mexico, or in the engineering sector with subsidiary Soluziona. 
Although diversification ouside the energy sectors have been punished by investors, the participation of 
the same firm both in electricity and gas markets is broadly accepted as a value-creating development, 
due to productive efficiency gains obtained through mainly vertical integration in the provision of gas as 
an input in electricity generation, and also to joint offers in the retail supply of gas and electricity. 
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but accompanied by a very high proportion, more than 45%, of investment 
announcements with a negative impact on shareholders. Trillas (2001) concentrates on 
the Endesa case, with especial attention on the Enersis takeover. This study reveals a 
negative and significant impact for their own shareholders and for the minority 
shareholders of the target firm in the largest acquisition of Endesa in Latin America. 
However, existing event studies, either they present a too general picture, or a too 
narrow one, without presenting as yet a quantification of the effect on shareholders of 
all corporate control transactions in the overall electricity industry. The fact that the 
largest firms have been acquirers makes it likely that the global result will most 
probably not be a net gain for shareholders (given that the bidder shareholders usually 
obtain worse results than target shareholders), but the exact quantitative exercise 
remains to be done, and will probably and reasonably have to wait until the takeover 
wave ends. The increasing takeover threat on these large firms can more recently be a 
discipline mechanism for managers, who possibly will be in a learning process on how 
to better measure investment risks.  
After the Gas Natural takeover, E.On showed interest in Endesa. E.On is the 
result of the merger of two large electricity firms in Germany in the late 90s, Veba and 
Viag. The resulting firm very soon engaged in a number of international acquisitions, 
such as Sydkraft in Sweden and Powergen in the United Kingdom, and merged with the 
dominant German gas operator, Ruhrgas.  In early 2006, E.On announced its last big 
acquisition, a takeover over Spanish Endesa, competing with a previous takeover 
launched by the Spanish gas firm Gas Natural. E.On thus followed the pattern of first 
creating a strong national firm and next expanding internationally. 
The Powergen and Endesa acquisitions were presented both as friendly or ―white 
knight‖ acquisitions. Powergen and Endesa also have in common that they were both 
the result of privatization and had been diversifying in other industries and 
geographically -Powergen in the US and Endesa in Latin America.  
The example of E.On is often shown to illustrate a trend towards vertically 
integrated global utilities focused both on gas and electricity, but abandoning 
investments in other industries such as telecommunications. The only significant effect 
of the main E.On acquisition announcements in the recent past is a positive abnormal 
return at the time of the Ruhrgas merger announcement. The announcement of the 
acquisitions of Powergen and Endesa did not have a significantly different from zero 
effect on shareholder value, although the sign of the abnormal return in the Endesa case 
18 
 
is positive. This is consistent with the theoretical and empirical research on takeovers, 
which expects that shareholder gains are captured by the target firm shareholders. In 
contrast with the acquisition of Enersis by Endesa, however, at least the acquiring 
shareholders do not expect to lose from these acquisitions. Since 2000 the stock market 
behavior of E.On had been much better than that of Endesa.
17
  
Since E.ON stepped in at the end of February 2006 with a bigger and better offer 
than that of Gas Natural, the government manoeuvred to frustrate it. E.ON was offering 
€29.1 billion ($34.7 billion) for Endesa—the biggest takeover bid in the history of the 
utilities industry—compared with Gas Natural's €22.5 billion cash-and-stock offer. 
After its own antitrust authority and the EU approved E.ON's proposal in April, the 
government's obstructionism intensified. Eager to thwart the deal, the government 
invested special powers in CNE, which is Spain's energy regulator and is controlled by a 
board that is close to the government. At the end of July 2006 the CNE imposed 19 
conditions on E.ON's bid for Endesa, such as a commitment to invest in gas-
transmission networks and an obligation to keep Endesa properly capitalised. Three of 
the CNE's demands were very controversial. First, E.ON would have to sell the only 
nuclear-power plant wholly owned by Endesa. Next, it would also have to sell all of 
Endesa's coal-powered plants, because Spanish coal is subsidised and the government is 
worried that the Germans would use cheaper imports. Third, Endesa's operations on the 
Balearic and Canary Islands, and in northern Africa, must be divested.  
After a takeover battle of more than two years, the end seemed to be near when 
on 1st Octubre 2007 ENEL and Acciona announced that they were in posesión of 
92.06% of the shares. However, it was not until February 2009 that ENEL obtained full 
ownership of Endesa, after a series of discrepancies with Acciona. The control battle 
that had started on September 5th 2005 finished almost two and a half years later.  
On July 4th 2007, the Spanish energy regulatory agency CNE approved, under 
twelve conditions, the takeover launched by ENEL and Acciona. The next day, the 
takeover was also approved by the European Commission. Between August 2005 (one 
month prior to the first takeover by Gas Natural) until October 2007 (when ENEL and 
Acciona effectively acquired 92.06% of Endesa), the value of the shares of Endesa 
increased in 119% (see Graph 1).  
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19 
 
Graph 1. Evolution of Endesa share prices 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance.  
 
Using the GARCH methodology suggested by Savickas (2003), the average abnormal 
returns for Endesa shareholders of events related to the takeover battle were 4.16%. The 
OLS results are 2.72% (see Table 2). This is consistent with our hypothesis that target 
firm shareholders are winners in takeover battles.
18
  
 
Table 2. Results for the Endesa and Hidrocantábrico takeovers 
 
GARCH OLS 
Firm Intercept Event 
Dummy 
Market 
Returns  
Intercept Event 
Dummy 
Market 
Returns  
ENDESA 0.000 
(1.60) 
0.041 
(22.42)* 
0.601 
(33.40)* 
0.000 
(0.73) 
0.027 
(5.56)* 
0.729 
(30.33)* 
HIDROCAN 
TABRICO 
-0.000 
(-0.27) 
0.031 
(40.79)* 
0.011 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(1.28) 
0.017 
(3.43)* 
0.058 
(1.07) 
* 1% significance level.  
In parentheses, t-statistic.  
Sources: LEXIS-NEXIS, OSIRIS, Yahoo Finance. 
 
The Hidrocantábrico Takeover Battle 
In 2000, EnBW, a German subsidiary of the state owned French firm EDF, 
announced a takeover of Hidrocantábrico, the fourth largest electricity firm in Spain, 
which has most of its assets in the northern region of Asturias. The Spanish government 
reacted passing a law forbidding any foreign state-owned firm from controlling an 
electricity company. This law would be subsequently rejected by the European 
institutions. The Asturias regional government was more open to bargaining, and since 
the beginning showed a predisposition to lobby for the takeover in exchange for 
industrial and employment concessions. The takeover battle triggered by the initial EDF 
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 And it is consistent with a large literature: Campa and Hernando (2004), Andrade (2001), Bradley et al. 
(1988), Eckbo (1983). 
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offer ended four years later, in 2004, when the state-owned Electricidade de Portugal 
(EDP), in partnership with a regional savings bank, Cajastur, made a final winning offer 
that was accepted by the shareholders of Hidrocantábrico, committing the firm to keep 
its headquarters in Asturias and develop a number of industrial development and 
employment programs. 
The case of the ownership and control change in Hidrocantábrico illustrates 
some of the more interesting aspects in the corporate control market in Spain, namely 
the role of the different levels of government (European, Spanish, regional), the saving 
banks, the state owned firms and target firm managers. Hidrocantábrico unsuccessfully 
opted to buy Viesgo when Endesa put it up for sale. Besides, the takeovers of Unión 
Fenosa and Ferroatlántica-EnBW implied the withdrawal of other takeovers that had 
been launched, respectively, by the US firm Texas Utilities and the German firm RWE. 
Furthermore, the Spanish government lifted the veto on the political rights of foreign 
state owned firms in Hidrocantábrico in September 2003 after receiving a warning from 
the European Commission.  
Hidrocantábrico was the target of five takeovers in 2000 and 2001, those 
launched by Texas Utilities, Unión FENOSA, Ferroatlántica-EnBW, RWE and 
Cajastur-EDP. That is, one US firm, two German firms (one of them with the state 
owned French firm EDF as the main shareholder), one Portuguese firm and one Spanish 
firm. The Belgian firm Electrabel also participated in the takeover contest as a minority 
shareholder. The winning takeover was that of Ferroatlántica-EnBW, although Cajastur 
and EDP stayed as minority shareholders. Eventually, EDP acquired, in a direct 
transaction in 2004, a share package from the rest of shareholders to reach 95% of the 
stock, in such a way that Hidrocantábrico became a subsidiary of EDP, with a Chairman 
proposed by the minority local shareholder, saving bank Cajastur. The successful 
foreign companies, first EnBW and next EDP, participated in the contest in alliance 
with local investors, with the goal of overcoming political resistance associated to the 
loss of control by national shareholders.  
The control contest for Hidrocantábrico, the fourth largest Spanish electricity 
firm, lasted more than one year between 2000 and 2001, and it did not end in practice 
until 2004 with the assumption of total control by EDP.   
One of the interesting issues in this takeover battle was that the regional 
government from Asturias (one of the Spanish Autonomous Communities in the North 
of Spain, where the company headquarters and most of its assets are located) and the 
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then incumbent management team called for the takeover battle to take place, setting as 
condition that the firm kept its headquarters in Asturias and that the ownership change 
was compatible with maintaining industrial and employment objectives in the region. 
This illustrates that not all governments support national or regional champions in the 
same way. With the outcome of the battle, economic and social agents in Asturias 
managed to make compatible strong gains for shareholders; the entry of a strong firm 
with the ambition to be a key player in the forthcoming (although several times 
postponed) Iberian Electricity Market together with the largest Spanish electricity firms, 
implying consumer gains from product market competition and improved productive 
efficiency; and the guarantee that the new owners would cooperate with ―strategic‖ 
objectives of industrial and employment policy, as interpreted by the Asturias regional 
government.  
Between the starting point of the takeover battle and the approval of the final bid 
by the European Commission in March 2002, the share prices of Hidrocantábrico 
increased by 120% (see Graph 2). 
 
Graph 2. Evolution of Hidrocantábrico share prices 
 
Source: Hidrocantábrico   
 
Using the GARCH methodology, the average abnormal returns for Hidrocantábrico 
shareholders of events related to the takeover battle were 3.1%. The OLS results are 
1.7% (see Table 2). This is again consistent with our hypothesis that target firm 
shareholders are winners in takeover battles.  
 
Merger between Iberdrola and Scottish Power 
The process of the acquisition of Scottish Power by Iberdrola only lasted five 
months. Iberdrola announced its interest in the Scottish firm on November 8th, 2006, 
and the courts in Edimburgh resolved the last barriers for the integration of both firms 
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on  23 de April, 23d, 2007. A plausible explanation of this is that market power in the 
British energy market is not high. This is one of the few energy markets in Europe 
where concentration levels are relatively low.
19
 This was ratified by the European 
Commission when it approved the transaction without conditions on February 15th, 
2007. On March 2
nd
 of the same year, the parties obtained the last regulatory approval 
by the Public Utilities Commission of the State of New York in the US, which was 
needed given that both merging firms had assets in the American market. 
The surprise announcement of the acquisition on November 8
th
 2006 was 
associated to a 3% abnormal return, computed both with the GARCH and OLS 
methodologies. If we compute the impact on shareholders between one month before 
the takeover, October 2006, and April 2007, when the acquisition is finally authorized, 
the share price increased in 20% (see Graph 3).  
Compared with the much higher increase of the value of Endesa and 
Hidrocantábrico during their takeover battles, in this case the value increase is 
substantially lower. One possible explanation is that these Spanish firms operated in a 
context of higher market power, with larger rents to be captured from reducing the 
number of firms. Campa and Hernando (2004) find that the announcements of mergers 
and acquisitions for firms in industries that had previously been under strong regulatory 
controls, obtain comparatively lower abnormal returns than when regulatory controls 
are less strict.  
Graph 3. Evolution of Scottish Power share prices 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance. 
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 For example the HHI for the UK after 1999 has been below 1000 points (Mattes et al., 2005). The 
thresholds established by the US and the EU define a market as highly concentrated at 1800 and 2000 
respectively. A market with a HHI below 1000 is defined as non-concentrated.  
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Effects of the takeovers on competitors’ returns  
Table 3 shows the effect that the Endesa and Hidrocantábrico takeover 
announcements had on their closest competitors in the Spanish electricity pool. In all 
cases, competitors experience statistically significant positive abnormal returns. For 
example, on occasion of the Endesa takeovers, competitors Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa 
experienced abnormal returns of 2.1% and 1%, respectively (both with GARCH and 
OLS). On occasion of the Hidrocantábrico takeovers, competitors Endesa, Iberdrola and 
Unión Fenosa experience on average abnormal returns of  1.7%, 1.4% and 0.9%, using 
GARCH, and 1.2%, 1.5% and 0.4%, using OLS. Unión Fenosa’s abnormal returns 
when the Hidrocantábrico takeovers are announced are not statistically significant, but 
this was at the time a small competitor. Overall, the results suggest that increased 
concentration derives into higher market power for all the firms in the market, along the 
lines of Eckbo (1983) and Aktas et al. (2006).  
On occasion of the takeover of Scottish Power by Iberdrola, in contrast, Brittish 
competitors Centrica and National Power experience non-significant positive abnormal 
returns of 0.9% and 0.4%, respectively, both with models GARCH and OLS. A possible 
explanation is that the Brittish market was characterized by a lower level of market 
power than the Spanish electricity market. Whereas the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) 
index in the early years of the XXI Century was below 1000 in the UK, it was between 
1500 and 1800 in Spain (Mattes, 2005). As explained by Duso et al. (2006) a positive 
reaction by competitors could be explained by the takeovers revealing information 
about potential efficiency gains in the industry as a whole. However, the fact that 
competitors react differently in markets with different degrees of concentration, 
suggests that market power is a more plausible explanation.   
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Table 3. Takeover Effects on Competitors 
GARCH OLS 
Company Intercept Event 
Dummy 
Market 
Returns 
Intercept Event 
Dummy 
Market 
Returns  
Endesa 
takeovers effect 
on: 
      
   Iberdrola 0.000         
(1.32) 
0.021        
(8.63)* 
0.443       
(24.61)* 
0.001         
(2.01)* 
0.021         
(4.73)*   
0.336                  
(14.41)* 
   Unión Fenosa 0.000         
(2.12)* 
0.010        
(2.83)* 
0.535       
(23.36)* 
0.000         
(1.08) 
0.010         
(1.99)   
0.525                  
(18.48)* 
Hidrocantábrico 
takeovers effect 
on: 
      
   Endesa -0.001 
(-0.83) 
0.017 
(7.11) * 
0.443 
(9.63)* 
-0.001 
(-0.84) 
0.012 
(2.75)* 
0.421 
 (8.72)* 
   Iberdrola -0.0002 
(-0.41) 
0.014 
(3.97)* 
0.201 
(5.09)* 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.015 
(3.34)* 
0.205 
(4.14)* 
   Unión Fenosa 0.000 
(0.03) 
0.009 
(1.16) 
0.232 
(4.82)* 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.004 
(0.83)  
0.252 
(4.43)* 
* Significant at 1%. T-values in parentheses. 
Sources: LEXIS-NEXIS, OSIRIS and Yahoo Finance. 
 
4.2. Mergers and Acquisitions of European Energy Firms between 2000 and 2007 
In this sub-section, we analyze the impact of 40 events
20
 related to mergers and 
acquisitions by 11 of the most important energy firms in Europe. The abnormal returns 
of these firms’ shares for these events are computed using OLS and  GARCH. These 11 
firms are: two German (RWE and E.ON), two Italiandos (ENI and ENEL), one French 
(Suez), four Spanish (Endesa, Gas Natural, Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa), one Swedish 
(Vattenfall) and one Portuguese (EDP). These firms were quoted in the stock markets 
between 2001 and 2007. We collected surprise mergers and acquisitions events 
(summarized in Table 4) for these companies using databases LEXIS-NEXIS and 
OSIRIS, between July 10th 2001 and May 31st, 2007. 
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 As in the previous section, three observations are taken into account for every event: the day before, the 
anouncement day, and the day after the announcement.  
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Tabla 4 Mergers and Acquisitions Events  
 
ENDESA SA (Spain) 
Date Description 
28-Feb-07 ENEL buys 9.99% of shares in Endesa, to start competing with E.On for the control of the firm 
25-Sep-06 Acciona buys 10% of Endesa for 32 euros per share 
21-Feb-06 E.ON offers to acquire 100% of Endesa SA for 27.5 euros per sharea. The transaction was later 
cancelled 
05-sep-05 Gas Natural launches a takeover for 100% of Endesa SA for 21.3 euros per share. The transaction 
was later cancelled 
EDP (Portugal) 
18-May-07 HC Energia (subsidiary of EDP) acquires 9.39%  NaturGas - Sociedad de Gas de Euskadi SA  
26-Oct-06 EDP exercises his call option to acquire 100% of OPTEP-SGPS SA. The transaction was completed 
on November 2
nd
, 2006 
04-Jun-03 EDP is interested in acquiring 75% of Turbogas Productora Energética SA. The transaction was 
cancelled on November, 12
th
, 2003 
31-Jul-02 EDP shows interest in acquiring 10% of Turbogas Productora Energética SA. The transaction was 
completed on September, 27
th
, 2002 
ENI SPA (Italy) 
03-Abr-07 ENI Angola Exploration BV (Subsidiary of ENI) agrees to acquire 13.6% of Angola LNG Limited 
02-Dic-04 Distribuidora de Gas Cuyana SA transfers 6.84% of its shares to ENI, while Inversora de Gas Cuyana 
SA transfers 76% of its stake in the same firm  
18-Jul-02 Agip Petroli SpA (subsidiary of ENI) acquires 100% of retail networks of Italys Tam 
07-Nov-01 SNAM International BV (subsidiary of ENI) acquires 40% of Trans-Austria-Gasleitung GmbH 
ENEL SPA (Italy) 
23-Mar-07 ENEL and Acciona launch a takeover on Endesa SA for 41.3 euros per share 
17-Feb-05 ENEL signs a contract for the purchase of Slovenske Elektrarne  
11-Oct-02 ENEL presents a prelimiary offer to acquire a share in Depa from Greece. It was cancelled on 15th 
April  2003 
E.ON (Germany) 
11-Jul-06 E.ON could buy 46.6% of Jihoceska Plynarenska AS 
22-Feb-06 E.ON reaches an agreement with RWE to Exchange its shares in Check and Hungarian gas 
distributors, where E.ON buys 46.4% of Jihoceska Plynarenska AS, 25% of Prazska Plynarenska 
Holding and 49.3% of Prazska Plynarenska  
21-Feb-06 E.ON announces a takeover on Endesa SA for 27.5 euros per share.  
16-Feb-04 E.ON acquires a share of Graninge AB 
31-Jul-02 E.ON Energie AG (subsidiary of E.ON) acquires 25.5% of Elektrizitaetswerk Minden-Ravensberg 
GMBH 
Gas Natural SDG SA (Spain) 
05-Sep-05 Gas Natural announces a takeover to acquire 100% of Endesa SA for 21.3 euros per share, which was 
later cancelled 
13-Jan-04 Gas Natural formalizes the purchase of Brancato 
18-Jun-03 Gas Natural acquires a share of 35% of Depa 
16-May-02 In the prcess of privatization Gas Natural SDG SA sells 23% of its shares  
IBERDROLA (Spain) 
08-Nov-06 Iberdrola ponders a merger with Scottish Power, which would subsequently be approved 
27-Sep-06 Construction group ACS acquires 6.31% in Iberdrola SA 
10-Mar-03 Gas Natural launches a takeover on Iberdrola SA. On April, 30th, 2003 the energy regulatory agency 
CNE rejected the offer. 
RWE AG (Germany) 
31-Dec-03 RWE announces its willingness to acquire 49% of Slovak Power Utility VSE 
19-Sep-03 RWE announces the purchase of 24% of Ibbenbueren Coal-Fired Power Plant, increasing its share to 
76%. The transaction was completed on December, 31st, 2003 
19-Nov-02 Gaz De France starts negotiations with  RWE Trading Direct Ltd (subsidiary of RWE) to buy it 
18-Nov-02 RWE reaches an agreement to acquire 20% of Wuppertaler Stadtwerke AG. The transaction is 
complete don November 5th, 2003 
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Suez (France) 
24-Feb-06 Gas de France and Suez SA announce a friendly merger.  
09-Ago-05 Suez announces the acquisition of 49.9% of Electrabel SA. The transaction is completed on 
December 13
th
, 2005 
10-Jun-02 Electrabel SA (subsidiary of Suez) acquires 11.4% of Compagnie Nationale du Rhone 
19-Sep-01 Tractebel SA (subsidiary of Suez) acquires 95% of Baymina Energy Inc 
12-Sep-01 Tractebel SA (subsidiary of Suez) acquires 80% of Houay Ho Power Co Ltd 
Unión Fenosa (Spain) 
10-Oct-02 Banco Santander Central Hispano acquires 4.3% of Unión Fenosa SA  
25-Jul-01 Unión Eléctrica Fenosa (UEF) acquires 25% of Unión Fenosa Generación SA 
Vattenfall Europe AG (Suecia) 
03-Dec-01 Vattenfall buys German firm Bewag 
12-Nov-01 After the likely merger of Vattenfall, HEW, Veag and Laubag an important energy group would 
emerge in Germany 
Sources: LEXIS-NEXIS and OSIRIS. 
 
GARCH and OLS individual regressions for each firm (see Table 5) show two 
results
21
 (consistently with Bradley et al., 1988, and Andrade et al., 2001): 
1) The firms that were mostly involved in selling transactions (Endesa and 
Iberdrola) experience statistically significant positive abnormal returns at the 1% 
level with both methods. For Endesa these returns are 3.7% using GARCH and 
2.7% using OLS; while for Iberdrola they are 1.5% and 1.2% respectively.  
2) The firms that were mostly involved in buying transactions mostly experience 
statistically significant negative abnormal returns. Only three of them 
experienced the opposite sign: Suez and EDP both with GARCH and OLS, and 
E.ON only with GARCH. 
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 These results are qualitatively the same using pooled OLS and SURE regressions for all firms, but the 
tests reveal that the system of equations does not significantly improve in efficiency relative to the 
individual firm regressions (see García-Rendón, 2010). 
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Table 5. Abnormal Returns for Mergers & Acquisitions Events:  
 
 GARCH  OLS   
Company Intercept Event 
Dummy 
Market 
Returns  
Intercept Event 
Dummy 
Market 
Returns  
EDP 0.000320 
(1.03) 
0.016293 
(6.65)* 
0.394865 
(14.38)* 
0.000139 
(0.40) 
0.014469 
(3.59)* 
0.394735 
(13.76)* 
Endesa 0.000303 
(1.30) 
0.036562 
(25.82)* 
0.739962 
(33.05)* 
0.000170 
(0.57) 
0.027430* 
(8.47)* 
0.851247 
(35.33)* 
Enel 3.11E-05 
(0.12) 
-0.008529 
(-2.11)* 
0.599324 
(25.63)* 
0.000120 
(0.38) 
-0.012259 
(-2,86)* 
0.654730 
(26,89)* 
Eni 0.000299 
(1.29) 
-0.009441 
(-3.03)* 
0.780516 
(32.05)* 
0.000371 
(1.32) 
-0.010498 
(-3.26)* 
0.765360 
(31.89)* 
E.ON -3.94E-05 
(-0.13) 
0.001085 
(0.48) 
1.001965 
(55.38)* 
0.000458 
(0.76) 
-0.014189 
(-2.13)* 
0.980839 
(19.86)* 
Gas 
Natural 
0.000490 
(2.15) 
-0.011407 
(-7.22)* 
0.592433 
(25.91)* 
0.000646 
(1.96) 
-0.014767 
(-4.36)* 
0.518015 
(19.07)* 
Iberdrola 0.000308 
(1.59) 
0.014780 
(7.94)* 
0.464185 
(24.63)* 
0.000618 
(2.29) * 
0.012074 
(3.71)* 
0.365580 
(16.53)* 
RWE 0.000598 
(2.01)* 
-0.014297 
(-1.50) 
0.861462 
(30.69)* 
0.000321 
(0.80) 
-0.014954 
(-2.37)* 
0.849849 
(25.59)* 
Suez 0.000637 
(1.72) 
0.018159 
(6.06)* 
0.302737 
(7.01)* 
-0.000108 
(-0.16) 
0.013766 
(2.08)* 
0.331980 
(6.50)* 
Unión 
Fenosa 
0.000661 
(2.75)* 
-0.027376 
(-9.99)* 
0.568988 
(23.91)* 
0.000560 
(1.61) 
-0.022328 
(-4.08)* 
0.583990 
(20.24)* 
Vattenfall -0.000956 
(-3.97)* 
-0.036767 
(-2.04)* 
0.089242 
(3.18)* 
0.000342 
(0.48) 
-0.039203 
(-1.83) 
0.054178 
(0.83) 
* 1% significance level. 
t-statistics in parentheses.  
Data sources: LEXIS-NEXIS, OSIRIS and Yahoo Finance. 
  
5. Concluding Comments: Competition Policy, National Champions and 
Corporate Control 
Case studies and econometric evidence presented in this paper, based on the 
experience of European countries, suggest that takeovers in the energy sectors i) tend to 
coincide with regulatory reform; ii) are very costly for buying firms; iii) generate 
significant gains for target shareholders; and iv) depend on the degree of (product) 
market power in terms of the impact on competitors and the shareholders gains to be 
made in the market for corporate control. 
Takeovers in industries that are regulated or subject to regulatory reform are 
costly and protracted because these sectors are usually politicized, and governments try 
to intervene in them at least for two reasons: to promote a variety of public or political 
objectives (which can be of industrial or labor policy, or more recently of security of 
supply in energy sectors, or promotion of national inputs); and (relatedly) to promote 
national champions in international markets (Sinn, 2003, ch. 8). Golden shares and 
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restrictions on foreign ownership are some of the forms that politicization may take.
22
  
The trend of operators becoming subsidiaries of large multi-national firms has triggered 
the prediction by some experts that in a not so distant future there will only be two or 
three large European companies that will share the European electricity market.
23
 If a 
small number of firms end up facing each other in all countries, it must be remembered 
that multi-market contact is one of the factors facilitating collusion, so that instruments 
must be developed at the supranational level to pay attention to this phenomenon. The 
fact that, in practice, the real market does not yet have a continental scale (due to lack of 
transmission capacity and other constraints) does not imply that anti-trust policy should 
not be used, and that the laws supporting a unified capital market across the European 
Union should not be implemented.  
European Union laws on anti-trust policy do not distinguish between public and 
private capital, and many national governments, with the resistance of the European 
Commission, the executive body in Brussels, try to stop the main companies from being 
bought by foreign operators. Strategies of defending the ownership of firms against 
foreign (often but not always state-owned) firms, in order to have any likelihood of 
overcoming the resistance of the European Commission, should better be based in 
principles that are recognized by the European norms, such as restrictions on State aid, 
or predatory behavior. Several studies have analyzed the incentives of state-owned firms 
to adopt anti-competitive behaviour, but it is difficult to state that the assumptions under 
which dominant state-owned firms in one particular country can abuse their dominant 
position, can be applied to partially privatized firms that operate in other countries.
24
 
Managers of partially privatized firms have a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders, 
which implies that they cannot depart from the profit maximization objective, which 
makes predatory behavior very unlikely. Foreign firms that are dominant in their 
original country are actually a guarantee that consumers will have credible rivals among 
                                                 
22
 In May 2006 the Spanish government repealed the golden shares regime, by which it kept to itself the 
option of vetoing control transactions on privatized firms. This instrument was available at the time only 
in Endesa and Telefónica, and had been in place for more than ten years (in the UK, the golden shares on 
electricity distribution firms were in place during five years, and when it expired in 1995, this triggered a 
takeover wave that changed the ownership of all involved firms). In 1999 the Spanish government 
introduced a law by which the political rights of firms dominated by foreign status were restricted. This 
law was directed at preventing French firm Electricité de France (EDF) from taking control, through its 
German subsidiary EnBW, of Spanish firm Hidrocantábrico. That is, as opposed to golden shares, this 
restriction vetoed not only changes in former state-owned firms, but also in those that had always been in 
the hands of the public sector. 
23
 See Glachant and Finnon, eds. (2003). 
24
 On the role of state owned firms in competitive environments, see Geddes, ed. (2004).  
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which to choose.
25
 What should worry European authorities is that, if anti-trust laws in 
the electricity industry are not harmonized, some operators may achieve competitive 
advantages from implicit subsidies in their local markets, with the consequence that the 
operators that end up giving service to consumers are not the most efficient, but those 
that are better protected at home.   
From the point of view of regulation and anti-trust, the diversified nature of 
firms is more problematic. To the extent that in a particular country (that is mostly the 
case of Spain) the dominant regulatory practice is rate of return or cost-plus regulation, 
and there is no incentive regulation, firms are interested in practicing accounting and 
managerial cross subsidies, that is, allocating high costs and relatively less able 
managers to segments where it is known that costs will be reimbursed no matter their 
level.  
An interesting feature of the takeovers of Hidrocantábrico and Endesa examined 
above is that the regulatory game conditioned the nature and identity of the firms that 
eventually resulted from the takeover battles. In Hidrocantábrico, eventually the 
winning bidder was Electricidade de Portugal in coalition with a regional savings bank 
(Cajastur) partially controlled by the Asturias regional government. In the Endesa 
takeovers some years later, Enel of Italy, with the Italian state as the largest bidder, won 
the contest against E.On after forming a coalition with the Spanish construction 
company Acciona. As the examples suggest, there is a risk that a disproportionate 
amount of Type I errors will occur: some good mergers will not be authorized. There is 
then a trade off between the different expertise of several regulators. Wolak (2007) 
argues that "few mergers involving generation unit owners in wholesale electricity 
markets will be able to survive this multi-stage, federal and state antitrust and regulatory 
approval process and still provide value to the shareholders of the merged companies. 
The public benefit standard applied by most public utility commissions provides state 
governments with a substantial ability to extract financial concessions from the merging 
parties that may cause the merging parties to terminate potentially beneficial mergers." 
This raises the risk not only of efficient mergers not happening, but also of inefficient 
                                                 
25
 This argument has finally been reluctantly accepted in Spain when it involves non-dominant firms in 
Spain. In telecommunications, the Spanish government did not stop the sale of cellular phone operator 
Amena to France Telecom or the entry of France Telecom in broadband through Wanadoo. In electricity, 
the government (eventually) allowed the control of Hidrocantábrico by EDP and Viesgo by Enel (see 
Section 3 above). 
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firms winning in some takeover battles:
26
 if winning takeover battles is costly and 
protracted, it will not be the firms that are best at producing electricity that win, but 
rather the best at playing the political game, or the ones able and willing to foot the bill 
of these protracted processes, such as firms with bad governance or public ownership. 
A merger or acquisition (especially if it takes the form of a takeover) changes 
the objective function of policy makers because more light is projected into the 
industry, consumers and other stakeholders mobilize and this has a well documented 
impact on the potential (lower) wealth gains to be extracted from the transaction. The 
existing literature shows that mergers in regulated industries take longer to be 
completed and show a lower takeover success ratio than in other industries; there is also 
clear evidence that deregulation is ususally accompanied by a takeover wave. There is a 
small literature on the optimal allocation of merger authority in the vertical chain of 
government (see Trillas, 2009). This literature focuses on the role of jurisdictional 
externalities in terms of the effect of a merger on the surplus that is captured by foreign 
consumers and the impact on foreign competitors, in a framework where a merger 
authority maximizes some combination of the surplus of national consumers and 
producers. There is no formal work to my knowledge on the role of regulatory 
authorities or on how to judge a merger from the point of view of it making more or less 
difficult the role of regulators when there are jurisdictional externalities.
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